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Transport infrastructure investment increased substantially in Britain between the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century.  This paper argues that the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 contributed 
to transportation investment by reducing uncertainty about the security of improvement rights. It 
shows that road and river investment was low in the 1600s when several undertakers had their 
rights violated by major political changes or decrees from the King.  It also shows that 
investment permanently increased after the Glorious Revolution when there was a lower 
likelihood that undertakers had their rights voided by acts. Together the evidence suggests that 
the political and institutional changes following Glorious Revolution made rights to improve 
infrastructure more secure and that promoters and investors responded to greater security by 
proposing and financing more projects. 
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In the seventeenth century Britain experienced a series of political revolutions.  Kings James 
I and Charles I fought with Parliament over religion and the control of government policy. Their 
political conflict became a military conflict during the Civil Wars of the 1640s. The monarchy 
was abolished in 1649 and for a brief period—known as the Interregnum—the House of 
Commons had substantial authority.  The monarchy was restored in 1660 with the return of King 
Charles II.  The Restoration marked an initial attempt at a political settlement, but it was not 
successful.  A lasting settlement was only reached after the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 
which ended James II’s reign and established William and Mary as the new monarchs.  
Following 1689 Parliament met regularly and came to control key aspects of policy.    
Many scholars have emphasized the economic implications of Britain’s political revolutions.  
In one of the most well-known works, North and Weingast argue that the Glorious Revolution 
increased the security of property rights and reduced rent-seeking.
2  The North and Weingast 
thesis has stimulated much debate and research, but relatively few works have investigated the 
connection with infrastructure investment.
3  This paper addresses this issue by studying the link 
between transport investment, political changes, and the protection of property rights.    
Investments in transport infrastructure were a key driver of the transport revolution.  They 
were undertaken by individuals and local governments who approached Parliament and 
requested acts establishing companies or trusts with monopoly rights to undertake projects. The 
                                                  
2 North and Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’, p. 803.  See Ekelund and Tollison, Politicized Economies, 
p. 81, for a related argument. 
3 See Clark, ‘Political Foundations’, Wells and Wills, ‘Revolution and Restoration’, Quinn, ‘The Glorious 
Revolution’, Sussman and Yafeh,’ Institutional Reforms’, Stasavage, Public Debt, and ‘Partisan Politics’, Mokyr 
and Nye, ‘Distributional Coalitions.’ 
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vast majority of these statutory authorities went on to improve or build rivers, roads, bridges, 
canals, harbors, and railways to the great benefit of users and investors.
4   By the eighteenth 
century Parliament was the primary regulator of statutory authorities. Through acts it approved 
entry, set maximum fees for users, and sanctioned any changes in the formal rights granted to 
undertakers.  However, the early history of river and road improvement shows that Parliament 
was not always the main regulator.  In the early 1600s road and river promoters turned to James I 
and Charles I for patents nearly as often as they approached Parliament requesting acts.  
Regulatory authority over road and river improvement shifted to the Commons after the Civil 
War.  Following the Restoration most rights were initiated through acts of parliament, but 
Charles II exercised significant influence and even revived the use of patents. Parliament’s 
control over regulation was not solidified until after the Glorious Revolution.  
The changing regulatory authority between the Crown and Parliament had the potential to 
greatly influence investment.  Promoters and financiers might have been reluctant to invest in 
roads and rivers because they were uncertain whether their property rights would be protected or 
enforced following a shift in power.  Similarly, promoters and financiers might have been 
reluctant to invest if they thought the Crown or Parliament might renege on privileges which it 
granted because of pressures from interest groups.  Regulatory uncertainty is a general problem 
in private infrastructure investment.  Once an infrastructure project is begun the investment is 
said to be ‘sunk’, meaning it cannot be recovered.  Undertakers thus face significant losses if the 
regulatory authority tries to expropriate their investments, lower fees, or redistribute profits.  
                                                  
4 For the literature on the effects of transport see Willan, River Navigation, Albert, Turnpike Road System, Pawson, 
Transport and Economy, Gerhold, ‘Productivity Change’, Bogart, ‘Turnpike Trusts’, Leunig, Time is Money’.  
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Theory makes strong predictions that undertakers will forego or delay investment under 
conditions where there is significant risk or uncertainty.
5 
This paper argues that the political settlement following the Glorious Revolution contributed 
to transport investment by reducing uncertainty about the security of improvement rights.  First, 
it uses case studies to show that undertakers faced significant risk and uncertainty in the political 
and regulatory environment of the 1600s.  Second, it uses regression analysis and structural 
breaks tests to show that the early 1690s marked a permanent increase in the level of road and 
river investment even after accounting for changes in interest rates, the growth of coastal trade, 
and the frequency of bad economic shocks.  Third, it shows that the likelihood that an undertaker 
suffered a violation of their rights by a political settlement, royal decree, or act was lower after 
1689.   
Overall the evidence suggests that the Glorious Revolution was conductive for infrastructure 
investment in part because it eliminated the long-standing conflict between the Crown and 
Parliament.  In the 1600s several undertakers had their rights voided unexpectedly following 
major political changes like the Civil War and the Restoration.  These risks were mitigated once 
the political conflicts ended.  The evidence also suggests how changes in regulatory authority 
influenced how disputes between undertakers and local groups were resolved.  In the 1600s 
disaffected property-owners or users could appeal to the Crown for compensation or lower fees.  
This system created significant uncertainty because the Crown could essentially make any ruling 
that it liked, either in favor of undertakers or against them.  After 1689 Parliament was called 
upon to resolve these disputes.  In the 1690s and 1700s several bills were proposed to alter 
                                                  
5 For the literature on investment and  regulatory uncertainty see Levy and Spiller, ‘Institutional Foundations’, 
Newbury, Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation, and Pindyck, ‘Irreversibility’.    
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undertakers’ rights.  Most of these bills were unsuccessful because they failed to get through 
committees in the Commons or they were vetoed by the Lords.   
The findings in this paper give a new perspective on the North and Weingast thesis by 
providing evidence that the Glorious Revolution made rights to improve infrastructure more 
secure.  It also provides evidence that there was an added ‘demand’ response in which promoters 
and investors responded to greater security by proposing and financing more transport projects.  
Together the findings yield the unexpected conclusion that the Glorious Revolution contributed 
to the investments underlying the transport revolution.      
The findings also suggest the impact of the Glorious Revolution may have been even 
broader.  In the eighteenth century there was a substantial increase in acts changing various types 
of property rights arrangements, including acts to create river navigation authorities and turnpike 
trusts.
 6  One driving force was the increased length, periodicity, and predictability of legislative 
sessions after 1689 as well as the introduction of procedural changes in Parliament.
7  This paper 
suggests that greater security may have also contributed to this broader phenomenon. By making 
the rights vested in acts more secure the Glorious Revolution effectively raised the demand for 
acts among individuals and local communities.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides more background on regulatory 
authority during the 1600s.  Section III illustrates the risks facing undertakers in the 1600s. 
Section IV uses a new series to show that road and river investment increased after the Glorious 
Revolution.  Section V shows that undertakers were less likely to suffer a violation of their rights 
after 1689.  Section VI concludes by discussing broader issues.  
                                                  
6 See Langford, Public Life, Innes, ‘The Local Acts’, Bogart and Richardson, ‘Adaptable Property Rights’. 





A number of scholars have documented the Crown and Parliament’s influence over economic 
policy in the seventeenth century, but less is known about their relative influence over the 
regulation of transport improvement authorities.
8 Willan, Albert, and other transport historians 
have documented the early history of navigation authorities and turnpike trusts which repaired 
rivers and highways throughout Britain.  This section builds on their work and provides an 
overview of regulatory authority from the early 1600s to the early 1700s.  It uses entries in the 
Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, from James I to George I to identify patents as well 
as proposals for royal privileges relating to roads and rivers.
9  It also draws on the Journals of the 
House of Commons and Lords, acts, drafts of bills, and petitions to the Lords to illustrate the role 
of Parliament.   
In 1600 most tidal rivers were under the authority of a Commission of Sewers.  
Commissioners were appointed by the Lord Chancellor. They had rights to compel landowners 
to cleanse the river and to levy a property tax to pay for maintenance expenses, but they had no 
authority to tax inhabitants other than those who were adjacent to the river, and they could not 
purchase land or divert the path of the river.
10  At the same time road maintenance was the 
responsibility of parishes.  These local governments could claim labor and materials from their 
                                                  
8 See Sharpe, The Personal Rule, and Ekelund and Tollison, Politicized Economies, for studies on the role of the 
Crown or Parliament in economic affairs. 
9 The paper uses the electronic version of the Calendar of State Papers available through British History Online. The 
Bankes Papers in the Bodleian Library were also consulted but they did not identify any patents or grants relating to 
rivers that were absent in the Calendar of Sate Papers.  Barrat, ‘The Bankes Papers’, p. 315, also points out that 
many of the proposals for patents in the Bankes papers are discussed in the Calendar of State Papers.  
10 Willan, River Navigation, p. 16.   
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citizens without compensation, but they could not levy property taxes or tolls and had no legal 
capacity to purchase land for new roads.
11   
In the early 1600s individuals began turning to Parliament to address these limitations.  The 
aim of these ‘undertakers’ was to extend the navigation of tidal rivers through dredging, 
diverting, and making new cuts.  They also wanted to repair and widen the main roads leading 
into London.  The first proposals were made through bills submitted to the House of Commons 
or the House of Lords.  Bills were reviewed by committees and then voted upon by the House of 
Commons or Lords.  Passed Bills were sent to the other House and later to the Crown for final 
approval.  Transport improvement bills generally dealt with individual projects.  They gave an 
undertaker authority to levy tolls or special taxes and established a body of commissioners that 
would resolve disputes between undertakers and property owners regarding the purchase of land 
or damages suffered.  The rights vested in river navigation acts were typically permanent and 
passed to heirs or assignees. Turnpike acts usually gave trustees authority for 21 years, but most 
obtained acts renewing their authority.  
The Crown began to play a greater role in the 1610s and early 1620s. In 1617 James I 
awarded a patent to Jason Gason with broad powers over any river improvement in England.
12  
Gason does not appear to have used his patent to exclude others from engaging in river 
improvements, although there is one case where he profited from his right.
13  Starting in 1619 
James I began awarding patents for specific projects.  In that year the Crown awarded a patent to 
                                                  
11 Albert, Turnpike Road System, p. 16. 
12 See Woodcroft, Titles of Patents of Inventions, pp. 1-2, for a description of Gason’s patent. 
13 Chrimes et. al., Biographical Dictionary, p. 647, states that Gason transferred his rights to improve the Great Ouse 
to Arnold Spencer.    
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the Mayor and Alderman of Bath for the improvement of the river Avon.
14  In the 1610s James I 
also began authorizing payments to individuals for improving specific highways.
15 
The process by which individuals petitioned and obtained patents or grants of privilege 
shared some similarities with acts.  Individuals usually approached the king or his advisors in the 
Pricy Council and described a particular project.
16  It was also the case that the powers vested in 
patents were similar to acts.  They gave undertakers authority to levy tolls and established 
commissioners to mediate disputes with property-owners.  However, the main difference was 
that the Privy Council was the final court of appeal in disputes over river improvement patents.  
In the case of acts, commissioners’ decisions were enforceable in common law courts, but 
appeals could still be made to Parliament.   
The growing use of patents by the Crown aroused controversy in the 1620s.  In 1623 
Parliament passed the famous Statute of Monopolies, which made it illegal for the Crown to 
issue patents except for inventions. Around the same time numerous bills were introduced in 
Parliament for river improvement. Panel A in Table 1 lists all river improvement bills from 
January 1621 to March 1629.  Many dealt with important rivers like the Thames, the Medway, 
and the Yorkshire Ouse.  In 1620s there was also a bill to introduce tolls on a section of the 
North Road leading to London.
17   
Parliament’s ability to pass road and river improvement bills was restricted because James I 
did not frequently call Parliament into session. Charles I carried this policy further during the era 
                                                  
14 Willan, River Navigation, p. 25. 
15 For example James I ordered a payment of 20 pounds to John Hare for repairing the highways between Highgate 
and Barnet.  See Green, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: James I, 1603-1610, pp. 590-605, April 27, 1610. 
16 For example, in 1633 someone made a proposal to the Privy Council to create a navigable river between the 
Thames and Severn .  See Bruce, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1633-4, pp. 41-61, May 1, 1633'.   
17 Emmison, ‘The Earliest Turnpike Bill’, p. 108-132.  
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of ‘personal rule’ from 1629 to 1640.  Charles I was able to avoid the restrictions in the Statute 
of Monopolies and issued numerous patents or other privileges to river promoters in exchange 
for annual payments.  Panel B in Table 1 shows that many rivers were proposed to be made 
navigable through royal grants in the 1630s.  Notice that Parliamentary bills are absent during 
this decade.   
Following the Civil War, the House of Commons gained complete authority over road and 
river improvement and several proposals were submitted to the Commons.  In this period, there 
was the first act explicitly authorizing the use of tolls to improve a river.  It gave James Pitson 
and others rights to charge no more than 4 pence for a load of goods and no more than 12 pence 
per passenger on the river Wey.
18   
The Commons had authority over road and river improvements for most of the 1650s, but 
there was a brief period in which promoters turned to Oliver Cromwell—the Lord Protector.  
Between 1654 and 1656 at least two proposals were made to Cromwell to improve rivers.
19  In 
1657 the Lord Protector also granted a charter to undertake improvements on the Yorkshire 
Ouse.
20  The expansion of Cromwell’s regulatory influence coincided with an enlargement of his 
political power.  In 1653, Cromwell dissolved the Parliament that had sat since 1649 and 
established a new constitution in which government was by “a single person and a Parliament.”
21 
There were another series of changes in regulatory authority following the Restoration in 
1660. In the first year after the Restoration there were two attempts to obtain rights to improve 
                                                  
18 Firth and Rait, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660 , pp. 514-17. 
19See Green, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1655-6, pp. 88-154, January 1656. There is also 
evidence of a third proposal in 1655 although it is not recorded in the Calendar of State Papers.  Jim Shead, 
‘Waterways Information,’ states that Andrew Yarranton offered to seek letters patent from the Lord Protector to 
make the river Salwerpe navigable.  
20 H. of  C. Journals, VII (1651-1660), pp. 575-578, 26 June 1657. Priestly, Historical Account, p. 491. 
21 Quoted in Seel and Smith, Crown and Parliaments, pp. 62-67.  
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rivers, but one went through the Crown directly and the other went through Parliament.
22  
Matters became more unclear in February of 1662 when the Lords passed a bill that would have 
effectively enhanced the authority of the Crown.
23  It allowed any municipal corporation, 
hundred, or county to improve a river in its area without authorization from Parliament.  
Furthermore, if any municipal corporation, hundred, or county did not improve the river, then 
any private person could get rights from the Lord Chancellor to improve the river.  In April 1662 
the Commons received the bill from the Lords.
24  It was read twice but did not proceed further 
when the session ended in May 1662.
25   
In the same session that the preceding bill failed, the Lords, Commons, and the Crown 
approved two bills authorizing improvements on the Stower and Salwerpe rivers and the Wye 
and Lugg rivers.
26 Several other bills were introduced for rivers and roads in the parliamentary 
sessions from February 1663 to August 1665 and no proposals were made to Charles II for 
patents or royal grants.  Thus in this two-year period there was a reemergence of the ‘Crown-in-
Parliament’ system of granting improvement rights.  As one part of this arrangement it appears 
that Charles II had significant influence over which undertakers received rights.  For example, 
Sir William Sandys was named as the undertaker for the Wye and Lugg.  Sandys received a 
patent from Charles I in the 1630s and was a prominent royalist who helped raise funding for the 
Restoration.
27  In another example, Henry Hastings was granted rights to make the Bristowe 
                                                  
22 In November of 1660 a proposal was made to the Privy Council to improve the river Dee. See Green, Calendar of 
State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1660-1, pp. 372-400, November 1660.  In May of 1661 a bill was introduced in 
the Lords to improve the Stower and Salwerpe. See H. of L. Journals, XI (1660-1666), pp. 249-251, 11 May 1661. 
23 A draft of the bill is in the Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/311. 
24 H. of C. Journals, VIII (1660-1667), pp. 400-401, 9 April 1662. 
25 The last mention in the Journals is April 28 1662.  See H. of C. Journals, VIII (1660-1667), pp. 414-415. 
26 See Private Act, 14 Charles II, c. 14 and Private Act, 14 Charles II, c. 15. 
27 Chrimes et. al.,  Biographical Dictionary, p. 592.    
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Causey navigable in 1664.
28  Henry Hastings was a supporter of Charles I during the Civil War. 
After the Restoration, he was appointed lord lieutenant of Leicestershire by Charles II.
29   
Charles II played a more direct role in river improvement after the mid-1660s.  Panel A of 
table 2 shows the bills for river improvement introduced in Parliament between the session 
beginning in September 1665 and the session beginning in May of 1685.  Panel B in table 2 
shows proposals for river improvement made to Charles II over the same period.  More bills 
were introduced in Parliament, but clearly some promoters were turning to Charles II, especially 
at times when Parliament was not in session.
30  In 1684 Charles II also reinstated John Mallet’s 
patent for the river Tone, making it the first patent awarded since the late 1630s.
31   
The Crown’s role in granting privileges was greatly limited after the Glorious Revolution.  
Only one river improvement proposal was made directly to the Crown during the reigns of 
William and Mary, Queen Anne, and George I, compared to more than one-hundred bills 
introduced in Parliament.
32   The Crown still retained the right to reject parliamentary bills, but it 
was not common.
33 
There were also changes in how local disputes relating to property were resolved. 
Improvement acts after 1689 continued to appoint commissioners to resolve disputes, but they 
also gave landowners or undertakers the right to request that a jury investigate the facts.  Juries 
were impaneled in the same manner as for criminal trials.  They had the power to make 
                                                  
28 Private Act, 16 & 17 Charles II, c. 6. 
29 Martyn Bennett, ‘Hastings, Henry, Baron Loughborough’.  
30 For instance, Parliament was not in session when the Earl of Bath and others proposed improvements on the Dee 
in April of 1669.  See Green, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: Charles II, 1668-9, pp. 258-305, April 1669. 
31 Green, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1684-5, pp. 109-132, August 1684'. 
32 For the only proposal to the Crown, see Hardy, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: William and Mary, 1693, pp. 
243-297, August 1693. 




recommendations to commissioners and they were also consulted by parliamentary committees 
who were considering bills to formally alter undertakers’ rights.
34       
 
III. 
This section draws on primary and secondary sources to show that several undertakers had 
their rights voided or diminished following major political changes or because of decrees made 
by the Crown.  It illustrates that there was significant risk and uncertainty associated with the 
political and regulatory environment of the 1600s.   
In the act establishing the Restoration settlement, there was a provision that all ‘orders and 
ordinances of both or either house of parliament….to which the royal assent was not expressly 
had or given…are and so shall be taken to be null and void’.
35   This provision was not designed 
to revoke the rights of river undertakers specifically, but it had the effect of voiding the rights of 
undertakers for the Yorkshire Ouse and the Wey because they received their authority from 
charters or acts in the 1650s. The case of the river Wey is revealing because the undertakers were 
unable to get their rights reinstated even though they invested £15,000 and made the river 
navigable to the Thames. In 1662, one of the undertakers for the Wey, James Pitson, tried to get 
an act reinstating their rights but the bill failed in Parliament.
36  In 1664, Charles II named a new 
conservator, John Ratcliffe, who was to have rights over the Wey for 30 years.
37   In 1664, 
Ratcliffe attempted to get an act of Parliament to strengthen his claim, but the bill failed to be 
                                                  
34 The Journals of the House of Commons provide several examples where juries gave testimony or made petitions.  
For one example see H. of C. Journals, XXIV (1743), 5 April. 
35 Quoted in Holmes, the Making of a Great Power, p. 28. 
36 Details on the petition are available in the Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/317.   
37 The details of this case are reported in a petition in the Parliamentary archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/319.  It appears 
that Charles II ignored the interests of the earlier undertakers in part because they used materials from his father’s 
confiscated estate during the Interregnum.  
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passed.  In 1666 a law suit was filed in the Court of the Exchequer over the possession of the 
river, but the Lord Chief Baron did not rule on the case for several years.
38 The authority over the 
River Wey was partially resolved by an act in 1670 which named Sir Adam Browne and others 
as trustees for the river.  The act allowed individuals to submit a claim to the Court of the 
Exchequer for part of the profits from the river.
39  Numerous claims were submitted and how the 
Court resolved the matter is unclear.
40 Regardless it is fairly evident that the original undertakers 
suffered some losses as a result of their rights being nullified by the Restoration settlement. 
There is a second example in which undertakers’ rights were voided following the Civil War 
and the Restoration.  In 1636 William Sandys was awarded a patent for the River Avon and 
invested more than £40,000.
41 In 1641 Sandys was expelled from Parliament because he was a 
supporter of the Crown.  Sandys’ rights in the river Avon passed to William Say, who was one of 
his creditors and a member of the House of Commons.
42  William Say’s property was attained 
after the Restoration and his rights in the river Avon passed to James Duke of York, the brother 
of Charles II.
43  Shortly afterwards Sandys petitioned to the Crown to restore his rights in the 
River Avon.  In his petition Sandys argued that Say unlawfully took control of the river by 
“receiving thousands more than he paid.”  Sandys pleaded to Charles II to “prevail with the Duke 
of York not to be the only severe one, and to suspend the delivery of any grant to Lord 
                                                  
38 Green, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1668-9, pp. 563-599, November 1669. 
39 Private Act, 22 & 23 Charles II, c. 26. 
40 Willan, River Navigation, p. 70. 
41 Green, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1661-2, pp. 610-632, Undated 1662. 
42 Crimes et. al., Biographical Dictionary of Civil Engineers in Great Britain and Ireland, p. 592.   




 44   Despite Sandys plea, Lord Windsor was granted rights to the River Avon as one of 
the last provisions of an act in 1662.
45   
Summers’ work on the Great Ouse describes a third example where undertakers’ rights were 
voided following the Civil War and the Restoration.
46 In 1638 Arnold Spencer was granted a 
patent for the Great Ouse between Bedford and St. Neots.  Spencer died in 1655 in the midst of 
financial difficulties and control over the navigation passed to his creditors. In 1665 an act was 
passed giving Sir Humphrey Bennet and others rights to collect tolls and improve the Great Ouse 
near Bedford.  Bennet did not make the river navigable, but the provisions of the act would later 
be enacted to the detriment of Arnold Spencer’s heirs.  In 1674 Samuel Jemmatt purchased rights 
to the river by paying £1200 to Spencer’s creditors.  Jemmatt acted as a trustee for his two sons 
who were married to the granddaughters of Arnold Spencer.  The navigation was then leased to 
Henry Ashley Sr., who then lobbied the commissioners of the 1665 act to name him as the 
undertaker.  In 1687 the commissioners granted Ashley formal rights to the river, ending 
Jemmatt’s claim.   
Undertakers faced other political risks besides expropriation. Willan and Albert have 
documented the negative externalities associated with road and river improvements, including 
damages to land, mills, or trade.
47  These losses created a legitimate demand for compensation 
payments from undertakers, but they also provided opportunities for local groups to extract rents.  
The commissioners named in acts or patents were supposed to resolve these disputes, but their 
decisions were often unsatisfactory to one side.  For example, undertakers often complained that 
                                                  
44 Ibid. 
45 The re-establishment of formal rights can be found in the final provision of the 1662 act to improve the Stower 
and Salwerpe, 14 Charles II, c. 14.  
46 Summers, The Great Ouse, p. 53. 
47 Willan, River Navigation, and Albert, ‘Opposition’.  
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landowners’ demands for compensation were excessive or that their maximum fees were being 
set too low.  In cases involving patents appeals could be made to the King or the Privy Council 
for redress. Groups could also turn to Parliament or the House of Commons if there was a similar 
conflict over an act.   
There are several documented cases in the 1600s where the King or the Privy Council had to 
resolve local conflicts involving patents.  A brief review of three cases shows that they had the 
ultimate authority to make a decision. This system bred uncertainty because the Crown could 
essentially make any ruling, either for or against undertakers.  Summers describes one case 
where there was a dispute over the tolls between John Jackson, the patentee, and nearby 
inhabitants along the Great Ouse.
 48  Local Justices of the Peace set the maximum toll on goods 
at 1 pence per ton in the early 1620s.  The President of the Privy Council subsequently raised 
them to 1.5 pence per ton.  In 1625 users appealed to Justices who ironically raised the tolls to 3 
pence per ton.  A final appeal was made to the Privy Council which then ruled that the tolls be 
reduced to 2.5 pence per ton.  In span of five years the tolls were first raised by 50% and then 
lowered by 17%.    
Willan describes a second case where Henry Lambe was granted a patent to make the river 
Lark navigable from Bury St. Edmonds to the River Ouse.
49  The work had begun when Lambe 
faced resistance from local mill-owners who claimed they were being adversely affected by the 
project.  In 1636, Charles I appointed a commission to investigate.  The commission came back 
with two recommendations.  First, Lambe should pay £40 per acre for the purchase of meadow 
land and £2 per acre per annum as rent for tow paths.  Second, the commission recommended 
                                                  
48 Summers, the Great Ouse, pp. 48-49. 
49 Willan, River Navigation, pp.27-28.  
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that no tolls should be levied on the river between the town of Mildenhall and the river Ouse, 
which represented over half of the route originally granted to Lambe.  In 1638, Charles I agreed 
with the commissioners recommendations and decreed that the river should be toll free from 
Mildenhall to the Ouse.  It is not known whether Charles I upheld the compensation to 
landowners, but if he did it would have represented a very generous price for land.
50   
The third example comes from a drainage project.  It provides a clear example of how 
Charles I could behave opportunistically towards undertakers.  Wells documents how the Earl of 
Bedford was given the right to drain the Fens by a royal charter in 1637.
51 In return the Earl was 
granted 95,000 acres of drained land, 12,000 of which was allotted to the Crown.  The project 
was initiated when locals brought complaints before commissioners in 1639.  The commissioners 
determined that the Earl had violated the provisions of the charter.  To make matters worse, the 
Earl was becoming closely allied with the parliamentary opposition to the Crown.  Charles I 
seized upon the findings of the commissioners and revoked the Earl’s charter.  Charles then 
claimed rights to 57,000 acres of drained land and imposed a heavy tax on the Earl’s lands.   
 
IV. 
In the 1600s undertakers faced both risk and uncertainty: there was not only a chance that 
their rights would be violated, but the likelihood of a violation could change significantly 
because of political events.  This section uses a theoretical framework to generate some 
predictions about the patterns of investment in an environment where there is risk and 
                                                  
50 Clark, ‘Land Rental Values, shows that rents per acre in the 1820s in Suffolk were £1.07 per acre.  This implies 
that a rent per acre of £2 or a purchase price of £40 per acre was very generous for this area in the 1630s. 
51 Wells, The History of the Drainage, pp. 105-127.  
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uncertainty.  It also uses a new data series to show that proposed and completed investment in 
roads and rivers was low in the 1600s before increasing permanently after the Glorious 
Revolution.  The new data series is based on all proposed projects between 1607 and 1749 
identified by entries in the Journals of the Commons, the Journals of the Lords, and the Calendar 
of State Papers, Domestic series. Parliamentary records and other sources identify the miles of 
road or river affected by each proposed project and whether they resulted in improved river 
navigation or repaired roads. Lastly the investments per mile for a sample of river navigation 
authorities and turnpike trusts are used to estimate proposed and completed investment. The 
appendix provides details.   
The theory of investment under uncertainty shows that when undertakers are uncertain about 
the risks they face then investments might be delayed or forgone.  To see why consider an 
example where an undertaker expects to earn a profit on an investment as long as their property 
rights are protected, but if not they expect to suffer a significant loss. Suppose that in the current 
year the undertaker believes their rights will be protected with probability q and with probability 
1-q their rights will be violated. Suppose also that next year they expect to learn more—say 
because there has been a shift in political power.  As long as the new information significantly 
changes the probability that property rights will be protected, it will be better for the undertaker 
to delay and wait until next year to make the decision to invest.  This ‘option-value’ can be 
considerable because the undertaker cannot reverse the investment once it has been initiated and 
they would suffer a loss if their property rights are not protected.
52   
The theory yields predictions about the patterns of road and river investment.  First, it 
suggests that investment should have been low in the 1600s if there was a high chance that 
                                                  
52 See Pindyck, ‘Irreversibility’ for a general discussion of the option value of waiting to invest.   
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improvement rights would be violated.  Second, it suggests that investment should have 
increased substantially following a major political event, like the Glorious Revolution, if it 
reduced uncertainty about the security of rights.  The data allow for a further distinction to be 
made between proposed and completed investments.  The available evidence on promoters 
suggests that some financed the project with their own savings and in other cases outside 
investors provided crucial financing.
53  The theory suggests that if the promoter has to make a 
significant investment to get the project approved by Parliament or the Crown then little 
investment will proposed and completed when there is high risk and uncertainty.  If outside 
investors are necessary to complete the project then completed investment should be low, but not 
necessarily proposed investment because a promoter might still initiate if their upfront costs are 
low.  Therefore the strongest prediction is that completed investment should have been low in the 
1600s when there was uncertainty about the security of rights and it should have increased 
following the Glorious revolution if it reduced uncertainty.   
Figure 1 plots a four-year moving average of completed investment from 1607 to 1749 in 
constant 1750 prices. The series does not represent all road and river investments in Britain 
during this period, but given the difficulties of investing without authorization from the Crown or 
Parliament it likely represents the vast majority of investment.  The patterns of completed 
investment in the 1600s are generally consistent with there being significant uncertainty.  There 
were modest levels of completed investment in the 1630s, the 1660s, and early 1670s, but there 
were no completed investments in the 1640s, the late 1670s, and 1680s.  Overall road and river 
investment was very low for most of the seventeenth century.  
                                                  
53 Willan, River Navigation, p. 66.  
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Figure 2 plots a four-year moving average of proposed investment over the same period.  
Proposed investment was generally low before the 1690s, but there were some significant 
fluctuations particularly after the Restoration.  The estimates imply that around £700 thousand in 
road and river investment was proposed in the 1660s, which is more than two times the £275 
thousand proposed in the 1650s. However, the Restoration did not mark a significant change in 
completed investment.  Only £90 thousand was completed in the 1660s out of the £750 thousand 
proposed. 
The low completion rate of investment in the 1660s was due to several factors. First, a 
number of promoters received approval from Parliament but did not complete their project.  
Henry Hastings, for example, did not make the Bristowe Causey navigable to the Thames after 
getting rights through an act.
54  Similarly the undertakers who received rights to improve the 
Medway in Kent and Sussex failed to make the river navigable.
55  Second, there were a number 
of projects that failed to receive approval from Parliament and were proposed more than once 
after previous bills failed.
56  For instance there were three bills in the early 1660s proposing a 
canal between the Severn and Thames and none were successful.  Willan describes this project as 
a ‘theoretical scheme’.
57 It was distinctive from most others because it would have required a 
tremendous capital investment.   If the three bills for the Severn and Thames canal are dropped 
from the series on account of their impracticality then proposed investment from 1660 to 1664 
would fall by nearly 40 percent, making this period look less remarkable. 
                                                  
54 Willan, River Navigation, p. 11. 
55 An investigation by a Parliamentary Committee in 1739 stated that “not any of the several powers given by the 
said Act, or any part thereof, had been carried into execution.”  See H. of C. Journals, XXIII (1739), 20 February. 
56 More than one parliamentary proposal was submitted for the Avon in Hampshire, for the canal connecting the 
Thames and Severn, and the Great Ouse in Bedfordshire.  Two proposals were made to the Crown for improving the 
river Dee and one was made to Parliament.  See the appendix, table 9, for more details. 
57 Willan, River Navigation, p. 10.  
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The late 1670s and 1680s are also an interesting period because proposed investment 
dropped significantly.  Investment contracted so much in the 1680s that it reached a level 
comparable to the Civil Wars of the 1640s.  This finding is significant because the conflicts 
between the Crown and Parliament intensified in the 1670s and 1680s. This period also marked a 
brief revival in the use of patents for river improvement.  
The ten-years following the Glorious Revolution saw an increase in investment that was 
comparable to the ten-years following the Restoration. One major difference was that proposed 
investment did not decline as much in the late-1700s and 1710s as it did in the late-1670s and 
1680s.  Approximately £740 thousand was proposed from 1705 to 1719 compared with £80 
thousand from 1674 to 1688.  There was an even more striking change in completed investment 
after the Glorious Revolution.  Approximately the same amount was completed in the fifteen 
years from 1695 to 1709 as in the previous 85 years from 1604 to 1688.  It is true that completed 
investment fluctuated substantially from 1710 to 1749, but similar cycles occurred in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
58 
The river and road investments completed in the 1690s, 1700s, and 1710s were associated 
with projects of great economic importance.  Many, like the Aire and Calder rivers in the 
industrial areas of Yorkshire, had been proposed much earlier in the 1600s, but were never 
approved or completed.  There were also several new projects, like the extensions of navigation 
on the Thames river system and numerous repaired highways near London.
59  
                                                  
58 There were a series of booms in turnpike investment in the 1750s, 1760s, 1790s, 1810s, and 1820s.  The well 
known canal boom occurred in the 1790s and was followed by the railway boom in the 1840s.  See Pawson, 
Transport and Economy and Ward, the Finance of Canal Building, for more details. 
59 For more on the transport improvements after 1689 see Willan, River Navigation, and Albert, Turnpike Road.  
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The surge in proposed and completed investment in the 1690s and their sustained levels 
thereafter provides some evidence that the Glorious Revolution contributed to a higher level of 
investment.  However, it is possible that the increase in investment was driven by other 
economic factors.  For example, lower interest rates might have made it easier for promoters to 
finance investment.  A higher growth rate of coastal trade might have increased the demand for 
infrastructure, particularly river improvements.  A lower frequency of harvest failures could have 
changed domestic trade patterns altering the need for infrastructure in some regions.   Foreign 
wars might have disrupted trade and lowered the return on investment.  These alternative 
explanations can be evaluated using regression analysis and structural break tests.  Suppose that 
investment in a given year depends on these economic conditions and investment in the previous 
year.   The regression model is represented by equation (1): 
t t t t x y y ε β β α + + + = − − 1 2 1 1    (1) 
where  t y  is either proposed or completed investment in year t,  t ε  is the error term, and  t x  
includes the real interest rate in t, the growth rate of coastal trade in t, an indicator for years when 
there was a foreign war, and an indicator for years when there was a significant harvest failure.
 60  
The constant term α  measures the annual level of investment independent of these other factors.  
If the Glorious Revolution had no impact on the level of investment after accounting for interest 
rates, coastal trade, harvest failures, and foreign wars, then the parameter estimate for the 
constant term should be stable before and after 1689.  However, if the Glorious Revolution did 
matter after accounting for these other factors, then the constant term should have been 
significantly different—and larger—after 1689.   Table 3 reports results from a Chow test for a 
                                                  
60 For descriptions of these variables and the sources see the appendix.  
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structural break in the constant term in 1689.
61  The F-statistics indicate a strong rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no structural break in 1689 for proposed and completed investment.   They 
also show that the constant term is significantly larger after 1689. 
The significance of the Glorious Revolution is further supported by unknown structural break 
tests.  The Quandt-Andrews unknown structural break test allows the data to identify whether 
there is any structural break in the constant and if there is a single break which year is most 
likely to mark the break.  In this procedure the Wald F-statistic for a structural break in the 
constant term is calculated for every year excluding 15% of the years at the beginning or end of 
the sample. If any of the Wald F-statistics for the intervening years exceeds the critical values 
then there is evidence that at least one structural break exists. The most likely break-date is the 
year in which the Wald F-statistic attains its maximum value.
62   
The results of the Quandt-Andrews tests are reported in table 4.  The Maximum Wald F-
statistics are highly significant, suggesting a rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural 
breaks in proposed and completed investment.  They also identify 1692 as the mostly likely 
structural break in proposed investment and 1695 as the most likely structural break in completed 
investment.  Therefore the data indicate that the years shortly after the Glorious Revolution 
marked a turning point in both proposed and completed investment even after accounting for 
changes in interest rates, the growth of coastal trade, or the frequency of bad economic shocks.  
The conclusions are similar in other specifications.  The break dates are still 1692 and 1695 if 
Newey-West standard errors are used to correct for auto-correlation.  1695 continues to be the 
most likely break if completed investments are spread over a four-year period rather than the 
                                                  
61 A structural break in the constant exists if for some year the coefficient is different before and after. See Hansen, 
‘The New Econometrics’ for a discussion of structural breaks tests. 
62 See Quandt, ‘Tests’ and Andrews, ‘Tests for Parameter’, for details on the Quandt-Andrews test statistic.  
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year the project was initiated.  The year 1695 is again the mostly likely break in specifications 
where all the economic variables  t x  are dropped and one where only completed river investment 
is included in t y .  If only proposed river investment is included in  t y  the Wald F-statistics 
suggest there may be two structural breaks, one in 1662 and one in 1692.  This makes sense 
because the data show a large surge in river proposals following the Restoration and the Glorious 
Revolution.   
Overall the evidence strongly suggests that transport infrastructure investment was higher 
after the Glorious Revolution.  Of course, there could be many factors which can explain this 
relationship.  The following section provides evidence that investment increased in part because 
there was lower uncertainty about the security of improvement rights after 1689.  
 
V.        
The theory of investment under uncertainty suggests that undertakers should propose and 
finance more projects if they face a lower risk that their property rights will be violated.  This 
section addresses whether undertakers faced lower risks after the Glorious Revolution when 
Parliament emerged as the main regulatory authority.  To address this issue all acts relating to 
river improvements were studied to identify cases where undertakers had their rights violated by 
acts of Parliament.
63  The most serious violations occurred when the authority of undertakers or 
trustees was voided or when their maximum tolls were lowered without their approval.  Other 
violations were also considered such as whether undertakers lost control of part of their road or 
river or they were forced to pay a subsidy to parishes.  The analysis compares the likelihood that 
                                                  
63 See the appendix for a discussion of the sources for public and private acts.  
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undertakers established between 1689 and 1749 experienced these types of violations by an act 
between 1689 and 1749 with the likelihood that undertakers established between 1606 and 1688 
experienced the same types of violations by political settlements, royal decrees, and acts between 
1606 and 1688. It also considers how the rights of undertakers established between 1606 and 
1688 were treated after 1689.   
Comparing the likelihood of a violation before and after 1689 is complicated because it is 
difficult in some cases to identify whether undertakers’ rights were actually violated.  Some 
undertakers may have lost their rights because they were negligent in carrying out their authority.  
Or—as in the case of most turnpike acts—there may have been provisions that Parliament would 
impose lower tolls on trustees once their debts were paid off.  This type of measurement error 
will create a bias in the estimated likelihood of a violation, but it is only problematic if it creates 
a systematic bias in favor of greater security after 1689.  It should also be pointed out that there 
is already likely to be a bias in favor greater security before 1689 because it is endogenous which 
undertakers propose projects and get approval.  If property rights were less secure before 1689 
then those undertakers whose rights were relatively more secure should have been more likely to 
propose projects and get approval. As a result, the observed likelihood of a violation for 
undertakers before 1689 may give an under-estimate of the likelihood of a violation for the 
population of undertakers in this period. 
Tables 5 lists all instances where undertakers established between 1689 and 1749 had their 
rights violated by acts between 1689 and 1749.  A table in the appendix describes these cases in 
detail.   The likelihood at the bottom is estimated by the number of undertakers who had their 
rights violated by at least one act between 1689 and 1749 divided by the number of undertakers 
who received rights between 1689 and 1749.  The estimates show that the likelihood was very  
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small.  There was only a 6 percent likelihood that a river undertaker established after 1689 
experienced at least one violation because of an act of Parliament. 
Table 6 lists all instances where undertakers established between 1606 and 1688 had their 
rights violated by political settlements, royal decrees, or acts between 1606 and 1688. Most of 
these cases have already been discussed in section III.
64  The main result at the bottom of the 
table shows there was a 33 percent likelihood that a river undertaker experienced at least one 
violation before 1689.  By these indicators it appears that the security of rights was much higher 
after the Glorious Revolution than before. 
A similar finding holds for turnpike trusts although there is only one observation before 1689 
to make a comparison.  Table 7 lists all cases where trusts established between 1689 and 1719 
had their rights violated by acts between 1689 and 1719. The results show there was a 18 percent 
likelihood that trusts established between 1689 and 1719 experienced at least one violation.  The 
only turnpike authority before 1689 was along the Great North road.  It was operated by Justices 
of the Peace in Hertfordshire, Cambridge, and Huntingdon.  Albert provides evidence which 
suggests there was a violation of rights in this case, but it is not clear that it was linked with 
national politics.
65  Albert notes that toll gates were never put up in Cambridge and Huntingdon 
and they were abruptly pulled down in 1680 in Hertfordshire.  This one example provides some 
evidence that rights to collect tolls on highways may not have been secure in the 1670s and 
1680s.
66   
                                                  
64 The 1624 Thames act is described in the appendix.   
65 Albert, Turnpike Road System, p. 20. 
66 It is worth pointing out that in 1680, 1681, 1687, and 1688 Charles II and James II removed many of their political 
opponents from positions as Justices on the County Commissions of the Peace and replaced them with supporters. 
These politically motivated purges were perhaps significant because Justices were often named as undertakers for 
road improvement acts.  See Glassey, Politics and Appointment, p. 262, for more details on the appointment of JPs.  
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The conclusion that undertakers faced lower risks after 1689 is unlikely to be overturned 
because of biases in the estimated likelihoods of violations.  The difference in the likelihood that 
river undertakers experienced a violation of their rights is quite large—33 vs. 6 percent.  
Moreover, an analysis of the cases also suggests there is no obvious bias in favor of greater 
security after 1689.  It is clear that undertakers suffered a violation when they lost their rights to 
the rivers Avon, Great Ouse, and Wey following the Civil War and Restoration.  Henry Lambe’s 
rights also appear to have been violated by the rulings of Charles I. Thus if only these four cases 
are considered the likelihood of a violation before 1689 would still be significant.  There are also 
cases after 1689 that may not have been violations. For example, an act in 1743 lowered the 
maximum tolls for the Company of Proprietors for the River Dee.  The company submitted its 
own petition stating that they “consented” to an act lowering their tolls.
67  It was very rare for 
undertakers to give consent to lower their maximum tolls and therefore it is likely they were not 
aggrieved by the act.  If this case is dropped then the likelihood that river undertakers had their 
rights violated after 1689 would be close to zero.
68     
Undertakers who received their authority before 1689 did not necessarily enjoy the same 
protections after 1689. Recall that these undertakers received their rights from patents in the 
1630s or through acts in the 1660s and 1670s.  Many of these undertakers failed in making their 
rivers navigable and starting in the 1690s local groups began submitting petitions requesting that 
new undertakers be allowed to complete the navigation. Thus Parliament had to decide whether 
it would maintain the rights of old undertakers who did not complete the navigation.  There were 
                                                  
67 See H. of C. Journals, XXIV (1743), 31 January.  
68 There is also likely to be a bias in the estimates against greater security for turnpike trustees after 1689.  For 
example, an act in 1740 reduced the maximum tolls for the trustees of the Stokenchurch to Oxford road.  The MPs 
from the committee reported that the debts issued by the trust had been paid off, and therefore it is unlikely that 
trustees were harmed by the act.   In another case the trustees of the Fornhill to Stony Stratford road appear to have 
lost their rights because they misinformed creditors about the revenues from the tolls.   If these two cases are 
dropped then the probability that trustees suffered a violation of their rights drops to 0.12.  
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also political aspects.  Several undertakers from the 1630s and 1660s were closely affiliated with 
the Stuart monarchy.  How would Parliament deal with their rights given the political tensions of 
the 1690s?    
The evidence suggests that in most cases Parliament did not violate these undertakers’ rights 
and when they did it was linked with their failure to complete the navigation.  Table 8 
summarizes what happened to the rights of undertakers who received their authority from patents 
or acts before 1689.  In 14 of the 20 cases undertakers’ rights were not altered by acts or they 
were renewed by acts. In one other case there was an act that eliminated a patentee’s rights, but 
they received compensation from the new undertakers.
69  In yet another case involving the 
Yorkshire Ouse, new undertakers were named but the original undertakers had already lost their 
rights following the Restoration.  In the four remaining cases (the Lark, the Soar, the Stower, and 
the Wye and Lugg) acts were passed naming new undertakers, but in all of these instances 
undertakers did not complete the navigation.  For example, Henry Lambe’s patent was 
effectively voided by an act in 1698 that named new undertakers for the river Lark, but Lambe 
was never successful in making the Lark navigable in the 1630s.
70   In another case the Sandys 
family lost their rights to collect tolls on the Wye and Lugg after they were not successful in 
making the rivers navigable.  The opening passage of the 1695 act confirms that the failure of the 
Sandys to complete the navigation was the official reason why their rights were revoked.
71 
                                                  
69 Haskell, ‘River Tone’, states that patentees for the Tone were paid £330 for their rights to the river after an act 
was passed in 1698. 
70 Willan, River Navigation, p. 151. 
71 The opening passage states that Sandys ‘never did anything towards the making of the said River of Lugg 
navigable. And what they did towards the said Work upon the said River of Wye was performed so slightly that 
most of the Locks and Passages by them made did in a very few years fall utterly to decay and ruin’.  See Statutes of 
the Realm: volume 7: 1695-1701, pp. 78-84.  
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There are two cases in the 1690s and early 1700s where undertakers who received their 
authority before 1689 successfully defended their rights in Parliament. They are described in 
detail because they illustrate that the rights of undertakers who made investments were often 
maintained.  They also illustrate that attempts by local interest groups to alter rights through acts 
were often unsuccessful after 1689.  The first case involved the Baldwyn family who invested 
more than £6000 in making the river Salwerpe navigable after an act was passed for this purpose 
in 1662.  In 1693 a bill was introduced in the Commons that would give the Earl of Shrewsbury 
and Lord Coventry sole rights to improve the river. Sir Timothy Baldwyn submitted a petition to 
the Commons opposing the bill on the grounds that his father had already invested in the river 
and that the proposed bill “tends to make void the said Act, and to take away all the works and 
materials done in pursuance thereof.”
72  Despite Baldwyn’s petition, the Commons passed the 
bill on March 9, 1693.  In mid-March, the Lords began deliberations on the river Salwerpe bill.  
Baldwyn submitted a petition to the Lords stating that “it is of dangerous consequence to take 
away any persons right, purchased under an act of Parliament, without their consent.”
73  The 
Lords ultimately dropped the Salwerpe bill and the rights of the Baldwyn family were protected.   
The second case involved the river Itchen, where an act in 1664 was used to make the river 
navigable.  In 1714 property owners near the river submitted a petition to the Commons 
requesting that provisions in an earlier act be modified because “it hath not been of effect to 
answer the ends for which it was made; but becomes a grievance to the petitioners.”
74  The bill 
was read twice and refereed to a parliamentary committee consisting of several MPs.  Numerous 
counter-petitions were submitted to the committee.  George Huxley, one of the undertakers, 
                                                  
72 See H. of C. Journals, XIII (1693), 2 October.  
73 Details on the petition are available in the Parliamentary archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/455/733. 
74 See H. of C. Journals, (1714), 12 March.  
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stated in a petition that “should it pass, it would not only defeat the petitioners of their right, but 
utterly destroy the said navigation.”
75   Inhabitants in the towns of Andover, Stockbridge, 
Whitchurch, and Winchester asked that no bill be passed in prejudice of the navigation because 
the river was “of great advantage to [their] city and country, by the cheap and safe carriage of all 
goods and merchandizes.”
76  The bill did not proceed any further after these counter-petitions 
were referred to the committee.   
 
VI. 
The transportation revolution gained speed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, but 
it had its roots in the seventeenth century with the promotion of road and river improvements.   
This paper argues that the political settlement following the Glorious Revolution contributed to 
investment in transportation infrastructure because it reduced uncertainty about the security of 
improvement rights.  For most of the seventeenth century, promoters turned to the Crown for 
patents or to Parliament for acts.  Some undertakers lost their rights following major shifts in 
power like the Civil War and the Restoration.  Others were forced to lower their fees and pay 
damages to local landowners. The low level of proposed and completed investment in the 1600s 
suggests that promoters were reluctant to invest in part because of these risks.  The Glorious 
Revolution marked a turning point.  Investment surged in the 1690s and remained relatively high 
in the 1700s and 1710s compared to the 1640s, 1650s, 1670s, and 1680s.  The increase in 
investment coincided with a lower likelihood that undertakers’ rights would be violated. 
                                                  
75 See H. of C. Journals, (1714), 14 May. 
76 See H. of C. Journals, (1714), 31 May-June 3.  
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Promoters and investors responded to greater security by proposing and completing more 
projects.     
There are several views in the literature on which factors contributed to the greater security 
of property rights after the Glorious Revolution.  Some emphasize checks and balances, while 
others emphasize the structure of political parties and coalitions.
77 The findings in this paper do 
not resolve this debate, but they do suggest some reasons why improvement rights became more 
secure.  The evidence suggests that the reduction of conflict between the Crown and Parliament 
played some role.  The fact there was no equivalent to the Restoration after 1689 contributed to 
the greater security of undertakers’ rights.  There are also some indications that the multi-layered 
procedures for passing bills made it difficult to violate rights through acts.  Bills had to pass 
through a committee where witnesses and juries gave testimony on the merits or demerits.  The 
House of Lords also had the ability to veto any bill passed by the Commons.   
The most important conclusion in this paper is that the Glorious Revolution contributed to 
the transportation Revolution. Acts creating river navigation authorities and turnpike trusts 
contributed to lower transport costs and generated social savings equaling several percentage 
points of G.D.P. in the early nineteenth century.  The Glorious Revolution contributed to these 
savings by encouraging greater investment in transport infrastructure.    
                                                  
77 See Stasavage, Public Debt, and ‘Partisan Politics’. 
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Appendix I: Road and River Projects 
Projects proposed to Parliament are identified through road and river bills listed in the indices 
for the Journals of the House of Commons and the Journals of the House of Lords.  A list of 
failed bills from 1660 to 1750 is also available from Hoppit, Failed Legislation.  Some bills were 
for rights to improve the navigation of a river or to better maintain and improve a road.  Others 
proposed to amend the rights of an existing authority.  Based on their description, bills that 
proposed to improve a road or river were separated from bills that amended existing rights.  For 
rivers I identify whether the bill was for an improvement using the petitions and committee 
reports.  For roads I only included bills that proposed a new turnpike trust. 
Projects proposed to the Crown are identified in the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 
series, for James I, Charles I, the Interregnum, Charles II, James II, William & Mary, and Queen 
Anne.  The Calendar of State Papers also documents most patents or royal grants of privilege.  
Priestley and Shead provide information on the length of rivers improved by acts or patents.
78  
The data in these two sources were used to determine the number of miles of river that were 
proposed to be made navigable in each petition.  In the case of roads, Albert provides data on the 
length of London roads improved by turnpike acts.
79  A report in the Parliamentary Papers 
provides information on the length of roads managed by each turnpike trust, including all those 
formed before 1750.
80  These sources were matched with petitions to determine the number of 
miles of road that were proposed to be improved.    
Not all proposals for road and river improvements were completed.  Some proposals failed to 
be approved by Parliament or the Crown, and among those that were approved some were not 
                                                  
78 Priestley, Historical Account; Shead, ‘Jim Shead's Waterways Information’. 
79 Albert, Turnpike Road System, pp. 224-229. 
80 Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee on Turnpike Roads and Highways, (P.P. 1821 IV).  
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completed.  Several sources were consulted to identify the number of miles of river that were 
made navigable through royal grants or acts.  These include Willan’s description of all navigable 
rivers at benchmark dates (c. 1600, 1660, 1724) and Priestly and Shead’s catalogue of river 
projects.
81  If an act was approved for a project and no information could be found, then it was 
assumed that the river project was completed. 
The number of miles of road improved through acts was approximated using information in 
the Journals of the House of Commons.  All turnpike acts had to be renewed every 21 years.  The 
petitions for renewal acts usually indicate the progress of improvement.  In cases where no 
renewal act was sought or when it is stated that little progress had been made, then the miles 
were not counted as being completed; otherwise the mileage approved by an act was counted as 
being successfully improved.     
The details of every road or river improvement proposal before 1689 are summarized in 
tables 9 and 10.  The projects proposed after 1689 are not listed, but they can be readily 
identified in the Journals of the House of Lords or Commons.  The first column identifies the 
name of the river or the location of the road.  The second column gives the year the proposal was 
made based on the first entry of the project in the Journals or Calendar of State Papers.  The third 
column shows the mileage of river proposed to be made navigable or the mileage of road 
proposed to be improved.  The fourth column identifies whether the project was completed with 
a one.  The fifth column gives the source where the proposal was identified.  If the Journals of 
the House of Commons (or Lords) are listed as the source then the project was proposed to the 
Commons (or the Lords) first.  If the Calendar of State Papers is listed as the source then the 
project was proposed to the Crown.   
                                                  




Appendix II: Estimating Road and River Investment and its Determinants 
Annual proposed and completed investment is estimated using the average investment by per 
mile for a sample of 12 river navigations and 43 turnpikes trusts.
82  These samples indicate that 
turnpike trusts invested £160 per mile on average in 1750 prices and river navigations invested 
£1340 per mile on average in 1750 prices.  These figures were multiplied by the number of miles 
proposed and completed in each project.  Completed investments were assumed to have been 
completed immediately, although they were implemented over several years. A moving average 
can be used to adjust for the completion time.  The estimates are not reported here to save space 
but they are available from the author upon request.   
The determinants of investment include the average growth rate of coastal trade, the real 
return on land, years when there was a foreign war, and years when the wheat harvest was bad or 
deficient.  Ward provides a data series on the growth rate of coastal ships entering and leaving 
for a sample of 16 ports starting in 1675.
83  Ward also provides data on the number of coastal 
ships entering and leaving 4 ports (Hull, King’s Lynn, Bridgwater, Minehead) before 1675.  The 
annual growth rate of coastal trade up to 1670 was calculated based on Ward’s sample and 
additional data from Southampton and Portsmouth collected in the Public Record Office.
84  The 
real return on land comes from the Charity Commission records described by Clark.  They 
indicate the purchase price or rental value of various plots.  Based on this information Clark 
calculates a rate of return on each plot.
85  Clark’s estimates for each plot were averaged to form 
                                                  
82 Bogart, ‘Did Turnpike Trusts’, p. 464 and Bogart, ‘Were Statutory Authorities’, p. 36. 
83 Ward, the Financing of Canal Building, p. 165. 
84 PRO E190 826-1827 and E190 819-827. 
85 Clark, ‘Political Foundations’, pp. 577-78.  
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the annual series on the rate of return.  The inflation rate was then subtracted from the real return 
on land to get an estimate of the real interest rate.
 86 Years when Britain was in a foreign war 
include the first Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654), Spanish War (1655-1660), the second Anglo-
Dutch War (1665-67), the third Anglo Dutch War (1672-4), the Nine years War (1689-97), the 
War of Spanish Succession (1702-13), and the War of Jenkins Ear (1739-48).
87  Years when the 
wheat harvest was bad or deficient are taken from Smith and Holmes.
88  
 
Appendix III: Acts altering the Authority of Existing River Undertakers or Turnpike Trusts  
Table 11 lists all acts where rights of river undertakers established between 1689 and 1749 
were diminished or voided.  Table 12 lists all acts where rights of turnpike authorities established 
between 1689 and 1719 were diminished or voided.  Table 13 lists all acts where the rights of 
river undertakers established between 1606 and 1688 were altered.  They were identified by 
studying all acts relating to road and river improvements in the Statutes of the Realm before 
1714.  The statutes do not contain private acts so these were obtained from the Parliamentary 
Archives.  The Statutes of the Realm also omit most river and turnpike acts after 1714.  For these  
the Acts of Parliament Collection at the Clark Library in Los Angeles was used.    
The 1623 act changing undertakers for the Thames near Oxford was coded as a case where 
undertakers’ rights were violated. A 1606 act gave the Lord Chancellor the right to appoint 18 
commissioners to oversee the improvement of the river between Oxford and London.  One 
commissioner was to come from Oxford University, one from the city of Oxford, and four from 
                                                  
86 Inflation comes from the Cost of Living index in Clark, ‘The Condition of the Working Class’, pp. 1324-25.    
87 Smith, The Emergence, pp. 307-308, Holmes, Making of Great Power, p. 439. 
88 Smith, The Emergence, pp. 436-437, Holmes, Making of Great Power, p. 446.  
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each of the counties of Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire, and Gloucestershire.  The 
commissioners had the right to improve the river, including the authority to force property-
owners to sell their land and assess taxes in their respective districts.  The 1623 Thames act 
vested sole authority in the commissioners from Oxford, and thus voided the authority of 
commissioners in Berkshire, Wiltshire, and Gloucestershire.    
There are two acts worth noting which changed rights but were not coded as violations.  The 
first involved an Act in 1726 (Public 13 George I, c. 34) which named trustees for the rivers Wye 
and Lugg.  In the preamble it states that the former undertakers of the previous act have not done 
anything to the river Lugg and little work was done on the river Wye. This passage referred to 
the Sandys family who lost their rights by an act in 1695 because of negligence (Public 7 & 8 
William III, c. 14).  The l695 act named a new body of trustees including the Lord Bishop of 
Hereford, the Mayor of the City of Hereford, and the Bailiff of Leominster. The 1726 acts states 
that several trustees have died and no provisions were made for filling up new trustees or taking 
in the heirs of deceased trustees.  The act named a body of trustees and created rules for the 
appointment of new trustees. The body included many of the same political or religious office 
holders as the original act including the Lord Bishop of Hereford, the Mayor of the City of 
Hereford, and the Bailiff of Leominster.  There are also individuals with the same family name 
who were trustees in both the 1695 and 1726 acts.   
The second case involved an act in 1732 (6 George II, c. 30) which named Nathaniel 
Kinderley as the new undertaker for the river Dee. By an act in 1698 (11 William III, c. 24) the 
Mayor of Chester was given authority to levy tolls to improve the river for 21 years.  The river 
was not successfully completed and after its authority expired in 21 years the city of Chester did 
not apply for a new act.  In 1732 the Mayor and inhabitants of Chester submitted a petition in  
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favor of Nathaniel Kiderley’s proposal to improve the river Dee (see JHC 18.1.1732).  It does 
not appear that this act violated the rights of the city of Chester which had already expired for 13 
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Table 1: Proposals to Improver Rivers in the 1620s and 1630s 
 
Panel A: Rivers Proposed to be improved through bills introduced in Parliament 
  





Colchester haven  1624 
Aire and Calder  1626 
Medway   1628 
Lark 1629 
  
Panel B: Rivers Proposed to be improved through grants by the Crown 
  
Great ouse, near Bedford  1626 
thames and severn canal  1633 
Soar   1634 
Rother 1635 
Lark 1635 




Tone, Bridgewater to Ham mills  1638 
Stour, in Essex  1638 
Notes: Bills in Parliament are taken from the sessions beginning in Jan. 1621 through the session 
beginning in January 1629. 






Table 2: Proposals to Improver Rivers 1665 to 1685  
 
Panel A: Rivers Proposed to be improved through bills introduced in Parliament 
  
Bristol and London  1667 
Dee 1669 
Weaver 1670 
Brandon and Waveney  1670 
Witham 1670 
Parret and Tone  1673 
Derwent in Derby  1675 
Derwent in Derby  1677 
Vale in Cornwall  1678 
Wye and Lugg  1685 
   





Blyth in Northumberland  1682 
Notes: Bills in Parliament are taken from the sessions beginning in September 1665 through the session 
beginning in May of 1685. 









Table 3: Chow test for a Structural Break in Proposed and Completed Investment in 1689 
 





  F-statistic  11.37 
  Prob. F(1,137)  0.001 
  
  Period  Constant (standard error) 
 
  1605-1688  3676 (10,505) 
 
  1689-1749  49,057 (16,525) 
Completed investment   
 
  F-statistic  23.03 
  Prob. F(1,137)  0.000 
 
  Period  Constant (standard error) 
 
  1605-1688  3494 (226) 
 
  1689-1749  21,532 (8629) 
Notes: The Chow test is conducted for the constant term α in regression (1). The constant term 
for 1605 to 1688 is estimated using observations only from these years.  The constant term for 









Table 4: Quandt-Andrews test for Unknown Structural break in the Constant 
 
Proposed investment   
 
Maximum Wald F-statistic  13.93
Probability 0.004
Year when Wald-F-statistics is maximized  1692
  
Completed investment   
 
Maximum Wald F-statistic  31.99
Probability 0
Year when Wald-F-statistics is maximized  1695
Notes: The tests statistics are calculated using software in Eviews.  The program calculates 



















































Colne, near Colchester 














Estimated Likelihood that undertakers established between 1689 and 
1749 had their rights violated by at least one act after 1689 
 
6% 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: the Undertakers established by acts between 1689 and 1749 controlled the following rivers and 
were established by the following public acts: the Wye and Lugg (est. 7 & 8 William III, c. 14), the Colne 
(est. 9 William III, c. 19), the Tone (est. 10 William III, c. 8), the Dee (est. 11 William III, c. 24), the Lark 
(est. 11 William III, c. 22), the Trent (est. 10 William III, c. 26), the Aire and Calder (est. 10 William III, 
c. 25), the Avon and Frome (est. 11 William III, c. 23), Yorkshire Derwent (est. 1 Anne, c. 14), the Cam 
(est. 1 Anne Statute 2, c. 11), the Stower in Essex (est. 4&5 Anne, c. 2), The Avon from Bath to Hanham 
Mills (est. 10 Anne, c. 2), the Nene (est. 13 Anne, c. 19), the Kennet (est. I Statute 2, c. 24), the Wear (est. 
3 George I, c. 3), Darwent in Derby (est. 6 George I, c. 27), the Douglass (est. 6 George I, c. 28), the Idle 
(est. 6 George I, c. 30), the Weaver from Frodsham Bridge to Winsford Bridge (est. 7 George I Statute 1, 
c. 10), the Mercey and Irwell (est. 7 George I Statute 1, c. 15), the Dane (est. 7 George I Statute 1, c. 17), 
the Eden (est. 8 George I, c. 14), rivers near Great Yarmouth (9 George I, c. 10), The Don from Holmstile 
to Tinsley (est. 12 George I, c. 38), the Beck (est. 13 George I, c. 4), the Don from Holmstile to Barnby 
Dun (est. 13 George I, c. 20), Yorkshire Ouse (est. 13 George I, c. 33), Stroudwater (est. 3 George II, c. 
13), new undertaker for the Dee (est. 14 George II, c. 8), the Weaver from Winsford Bridge to the Town 
of Namptwich (est. 7 George II, c. 28), Worsley Brook (est. 10 George II, c. 9), Rodon (est. 10 George II, 









Table 6: Political Settlements, Royal Decrees, and Acts Violating the Rights of River 
Undertakers established between 1605 and 1688 
 
River 











Great Ouse (St. Neots to St. Ives) 











Avon (Warwickshire)  

















Great Ouse (Bedford to St. Neots) 











Estimated Likelihood that undertakers established between 1605 and 
1688 had their rights violated by at least one settlement, decree, or act. 
 
33% 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: the Undertakers established by act or patent between 1605 and 1688 controlled the following 
rivers and were established in the following acts or patents: the Thames near Oxford (est. Public 3 James 
I, c. 20), the Great Ouse from St. Ives to St. Neots (est. patent 1617), the Thames near Oxford (est. act 
1623, second group of undertakers), the Colchester Haven  (est. act 1624), the Soar (est. patent 1634), the 
Lark (est. patent 1635), the Avon in Warwickshire (est. patent 1636), the Tone (est. patent 1638), Stower 
(est. patent 1638), Wey (est. act of the Interregnum 1651), Yorkshire Ouse (est. charter Lord Protector, 
1657), Stower and Salwerpe (est. private act 14 Charles II, c. 14), Wye and Lugg (est. private act 14 
Charles II, c. 15), Bristowe Causey (est. private act  16 & 17 Charles II, c. 6), Avon from Christchurch to 
New Sarum (est. private 16 & 17 Charles II, c. 11), Medway in Kent and Sussex (est. private 16 & 17 
Charles II, c. 12), Itchin, Great Ouse, and Mole (private 16 & 17 Charles II, c. 13), Witham (private 22 & 
23 Charles II, c. 25), Wey (est. private 22 & 23 Charles II, c. 26, second set of undertakers), Branden and 




Table 7: Acts Violating the Rights of Turnpike Trusts Established between 1689 and 1719 
 
Road 





Northfleet to Rochester 





Cherrill to Studley Bridge 




Hockliffe to Woborne 




Shepards Shord to Horsley 




Stokenchurch to Oxford 




Fornhill to Stony Stratford Road 








Estimated Likelihood that turnpike trustees established between 
1689 and 1719 had their rights violated by at least one act 
 
18% 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: Tusts established by acts between 1689 and 1719 controlled the following roads and were 
established by the following public acts: Wadesmill to Stilton (est. 4 WM, c. 9), Shenfield to Harwich 
(est. 7,8 WM c.9), Wymondham to Attelborough (est. 7,8 WM c.26), Reigate to Crawley (est. 8,9 WM 
c.15), Gloucester to Birdlip Hill (est. 9 WM c.18), Woodford to Thornwood (est. 1 A 2 c.10), Barnhill 
and Hutton Heath (est. 4,5  A c.26), Fornhill to Stoney Straford (est. 6 AN c.4), Hockliffe to Woburn (est. 
6 AN c.13), Bath roads (est. 6 AN c.42), Cherill to Studley Bridge (est. 6 AN c.76), Stratford to 
Dunchurch (est. 6 AN c.77), Sevenoaks to Tunbridge Wells (est. 8 AN c. 20), Stoke Goldington to 
Northampton (est. 8 AN c. 9), Dunstable and Hockliffe (est. 9 AN c.34), Petersfield to Portsmouth (est. 9 
AN c.33), Royston to Wandsford Bridge (est. 9 AN c.14), Ipswich to Cleydon (est. 10 AN), Highgate to 
Barnet (est. 10 AN c.4), Kilburn Bridge to Sparrow Herne (est. 10 AN c.3), Northfleet to Rochester (est. 
10 AN c.16), St. Leonard to Chestnut (est. 12 AN c.19), Reading to Puntfield (est. 13 AN c.28), Shepherd 
Shord to Bagdon (est. 13 AN c.17), Tittensor to Butlane (est. 13 AN c.31), Worcester to Droitwich (est. 
13 AN c.27), St. Albans to South Mimms (est. 1 GI c.12), Tyburn to Uxbridge (est. 1 GI 25), St. Giles to 
Hornsey, Islington to Highgate (est. 3 GI c.4), Kensington to Cranford Bridge (est. 3 GI c.14), 
Maidenhead Bridge to Henley (est. 4 GI c.6), Reading to Basingstoke (est. 4 GI c.7), Beaconsfield to 
Stokenchurch (est. 5 GI c.1), and Stokenchurch to Woodstock (est. 5 GI c.2).  
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Table 8: Summary of River Undertakers with Rights from Patents and Acts before 1689 
River Original  undertaker 
Year 
Granted Completed Rights changed by act, 1689-1749 
 








Act in 1719 gives undertaker in 1687 
more rights.  
Thames, near Oxford  Commissioners   1623  Yes  Acts in 1694 and 1729 renew authority 
Colne, near Colchester    1623  No  Act in 1698 names undertakers 
Great Ouse, near Bedford  Arnold Spencer  1627  No  None 
Soar Thomas  Skipworth  1634  No  None 
Lark  Henry Lambe  1635  No  Act in 1698 names new undertakers.  













Act in 1698 establishes new 
undertakers.  Undertakers compensate 
patentees who renewed rights in 1684 
Stour in Essex  Arnold Spencer  1638  No  Act in 1705 names new undertakers 










Act in 1725 names new undertakers, 
but old undertakers rights were 
already voided by Restoration.  
Stower and Salwerpe  Sir Thomas Baldwyn  1662  Yes  None 
Wye and Lugg  William Sandys  1662  No  Act in 1695 voids Sandy family rights 
Bristowe Causey  Henry Hastings  1664  No  None 
Avon, Christchurch to 
New Sarum 








Medway in Sussex 
 






Act in 1739 names new undertakers 
 
Itchen, Great Ouse near 
Bedford, and Mole 








Witham Mayor  Lincolnshire  1670  Yes  None 
Bradon and Waveney  Mayor of Yarmouth  1670  No  None 
Vale Charles  Erebanion  1678  Yes  None 







Table 9: Proposals for River Improvement, 1606-1688 
 
River  Year  Miles completed Source 
Avon 1606  12  0 
 
JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 273, 24 February 1606.  
Thames 1606  15  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 299, 16 April 1606.  
Great ouse, St. Neots to St. 
Ives  1617 23  1  Summers,  Great Ouse, p. 48.  
Avon, bath to Bristol  1619  12  0  CSP, Domestic: James I, 1619-23, pp. 57-68, July 1619.  
Yorkshire Ouse  1621  18  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 605-606, May 1621.  
Thames 1621  15  0  JHL: volume 3: 1620-1628, pp. 37-38, 6 March 1621.  
Wey 1621  20  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 560-561, 17 March 1621.  
Thames 1624  15  1  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, 19 March 1624.  
Wey 1624  20  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 704, 14 May 1624. 
Colchester haven  1624  5  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, 04 May 1624.  
Aire and Calder  1626  25  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 836-837, 15 March 1626. 
Great ouse, near Bedford  1626  10  0  CSP: Charles I, 1625-26, pp. 299-311, April 1-15, 1626.  
Medway,  maidstone to 
penhurst 1628  22  0  JHL: volume 3: 1620-1628, pp. 781-782, 6 May 1628. 
Lark, Bury to the Ouse  1629  14  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 931-932, 20 February 1629.  
thames and severn canal  1633  60  0  CSP: Charles I, 1633-4, pp. 41-61, May 1-17, 1633. 
Soar,  leceicester and trent  1634  16  0  Willan, River Navigation, p. 26.  
Rother, bodiham to rye  1635  20  0  CSP: Charles I, 1635, pp. 51-76, May 1-16, 1635. 
Lark, Bury to the Ouse  1635  14  0  CSP: Charles I, 1635, pp. 519-559, December 1-13, 163. 
Avon, in Warwickshire  1636  25  1  CSP: Charles I, 1635-6, pp. 521-549, June 1-9, 1636.  
Teme towards Ludlow  1636  40  0  CSP: Charles I, 1635-6, pp. 264-292, March 1-12, 1636.  
fossdyke, enlargement  1636  11  0  CSP: Charles I, 1636-7, pp. 254-268, Undated 1636.  
Witham, boston to 
washingborough   1636  30  0  CSP: Charles I, 1636-7, pp. 254-268, Undated 1636.  
Tone, Bridgewater to Ham 
mills 1638  11  0  Willan,  River Navigation, p. 27.  
Stour, in Essex  1638  23  0  CSP: Charles I, 1637-8, pp. 289-314, March 1-18, 1638.  
Wye 1641  20  0  JHC: volume 2: 1640-1643, pp. 89, 19 February 1641. 
Arrundel, to the Thames  1641  13  0  JHL: volume 4: 1629-42 , pp. 167, 19 February 1641.  
Welland, stamford to deeping  1650  10  0  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651, pp. 507, 11 December 1650.  
Wey 1650  20  1  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651, pp. 515, 26 December 1650. 
Wye and Lugg  1651  20  0  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651, pp. 542, 26 February 1651.  
Ouse in Yorkshire  1651  18  0  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651, pp. 542, 26 February 1651.  
Darwent in Yorkshire  1651  38  0  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651, pp. 542, 26 February 1651. 
avon, bath to Bristol  1654  12  0  CSP: Interregnum, 1654, pp. 194-232, June 1654.  
Wye and Lugg  1656  20  0  CSP: Interregnum, 1655-6, pp. 88-154, January 1656.  
Ouse in Yorkshire  1657  18  0  JHC: volume 7: 1651-1660, pp. 504-505, 16 March 1657.  
Avon, bath to Bristol  1657  12  0  JHC: volume 7: 1651-1660, pp. 510-511, 24 March 1657.  
Nyne 1657  25  0  JHC: volume 7: 1651-1660, pp. 536-537, 21 May 1657'.  
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Avon, bath to Bristol  1658  12  0  JHC: volume 7: 1651-1660, pp. 588, 26 January 1658. 
Dee 1660  8  0  CSP: Charles II, 1660-1, pp. 372-400, November 1660.  
Stower and Salwerp  1661  20  1  JHL: volume 11: 1660-1666, pp. 249-251, 11 May 1661.  
London to Bristol  1662  50  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 369-370, 21 February 1662. 
Avon, Salisbury to Christ 
Church 1662  36  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 369-370, 21 February 1662.  
Yorkshire Ouse  1662  18  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 369-370, 21 February 1662.  
Wye and Lugg  1662  20  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 389-390, 19 March 1662.  
Great Ouse, near Bedford  1663  23  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 447-448, 10 March 1663.  
Mersey and Weaver  1663  20  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 444, 5 March 1663. 
Vale in Cornwall  1664  10  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 570, 1 December 1664.  
Darwent 1664  10  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 575-576, 13 December 1664. 
Bristol and London  1664  50  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 546, 19 April 1664. 
Bristol and London  1664  50  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 570-571, 2 December 1664.  
Avon, to Christ Church  1664  36  1  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 575-576, 13 December 1664.  
Bristowe Causey into thames  1664  16  0  JHL: volume 11: 1660-1666, pp. 635, 9 December 1664.  
Itchen 1664  10  1  JHL: volume 11: 1660-1666, pp. 638, 15 December 1664.  
ouse, lewes to Newhaven  1664  10  0  CSP: Charles II, 1663-4, pp. 631-657, July 1664. 
Medway 1665  22  0  JHL: volume 11: 1660-1666, pp. 644, 19 January 1665.  
Great ouse, near Bedford  1665  23  0  Summers, the Great Ouse, p. 53 
Mole 1665  20  0  JHL: volume 11: 1660-1666, pp. 638, 15 December 1664.  
Cam 1665  7  0  CSP: Charles II, 1665-6, pp. 38-58, November 1-14, 1665.  
Dee 1666  8  0  CSP: Charles II, 1665-6, pp. 424-441, June 1-14, 1666.  
Bristol and London  1667  50  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 6, 22 October 1667. 
Dee 1669  8  0  CSP: Charles II, 1668-9, pp. 258-305, April 1669.  
Dee 1669  8  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 109, 19 November 1669.  
Weaver 1670  20  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 186-187, 20 December 1670.  
Brandon and Waveney  1670  23  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 130-131, 2 March 1670.  
Witham, boston to trent  1670  30  1  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 159-160, 3 November 1670.  
Parret and Thone, Bridgewater 
to Bradford Bridge  1673  22  0  JHL: volume 12: 1666-1675, pp. 539-541, 1 March 1673.  
Derwent in Derby  1675  10  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 368-369, 6 November 1675.  
Derwent in Derby  1677  10  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 393, 6 March 1677.  
Vale in Cornwall  1678  10  1  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687, pp. 453-454, 14 March 1678.  
Blyth in Northumberland  1682  8  0  CSP Domestic: Charles II, 1682, pp. 279-321, July 1682.  
Wye and Lugg  1685  20  0  JHC: volume 9: 1667-1687 (1802), pp. 739-741, 18 June 1685.  
Sources: see text. 
Notes: JHC is the Journal of the House of Commons, JHL is the Journal of the House of Lords, and CSP 





Table 10: Proposals for road Improvement, 1606-1688 
 
Road  Year miles completed Source 
Between London and watford  1605  15  1  CSP: James I, 1603-1610, pp. 265-277, Dec., 1605.  
Between Nonsuch and Talworth  1606  40  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629, pp. 288, 21 March 1606. 
Between London, royston and 
newmarket 1609  25  1  CSP: James I, 1603-1610, pp. 524-540, July, August, 1609. 
Between Highgate and Barnet  1610  6  1  CSP: James I, 1603-1610, pp. 590-605, March, April 1610. 
Biggleswade 1610  12  0  JHC: volume 1: 1547-1629 , pp. 403, 01 March 1610. 
Between Puckeridge and Royston  1612  13  1  CSP: James I, 1611-18, pp. 109-117, January 1612'.  
Hertfordshire Roads  1622  5  1  CSP: James I, 1619-23, pp. 401-418, June 1622.  
Near Biggleswade Bedfordshire'  1622  12  0  Emmison, 'the First Turnpike Bill'. 
Between chelsea and fulham  1626  5  1  CSP: Charles I, 1625-26, pp. 533-582, Appendix.  
between Maidenhead and Reading 
and Maidenhead and Henley  1634 20  1  CSP: Charles I, 1633-4, pp. 537-559, April 1-19, 1634.  
London and Middlesex roads  1650  25  0  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651, pp. 442-443, 18 July 1650.  
London, near East Smithfield and 
the tower  1650  5  0  JHC: volume 6: 1648-1651 , pp. 486-487, 23 October 1650. 
Near Standon Bedfordshire  1661  15  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667 , pp. 292-294, 6 July 1661.  
Great North Road in Cambridge  1663  15  1  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 455, 21 March 1663.  
Watlingstreet Road near Bedford  1663  15  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 438-439, 23 Feb. 1663.  
Standon Road  1663  15  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 455, 21 March 1663.  
London to Chester  1664  170  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 583-584, 17 January 1665. 
Highways in Bedford, Bucks, 
Northampton, and Warwick  1664  50  0  JHC: volume 8: 1660-1667, pp. 570, 1 December 1664.  
Sources: see text. 
Notes: JHC is the Journal of the House of Commons, JHL is the Journal of the House of Lords, 






































Extension initiated by a petition from Mayor, Aldermen, Assistants, and Common-
Council of Colchester, who served as undertakers for the earlier act.  They stated that 
they had an outstanding debt of 12,000 pounds and could not repay the debt without 
an extension of their authority.  An act was passed extending their rights for another 










Extension initiated by the commissioners of the act and the city leaders of Colchester.  
They request that their powers be extended for another 21 years so they can maintain 
a lock.  The act was passed extending their rights for another 21 years.  Toll on coal 
was reduced further to 3 pence. 
 
Dee/  










Amendment initiated by mayor and citizens of Chester requesting that the tolls on the 
river be reduced to encourage trade.  The Dee company also submitted a petition 
consenting to the reduction in tolls.  The act was passed reducing the tolls on all types 
of vessels. 
 













Table 12: Acts altering rights for Turnpike Trusts created between 1689 and 1719 
 
Road 
Public Act  Year Details 
 
Hockliffe to 










Original act names Bedfordshire JPs as trustees.  First renewal initiated in year that the 
original act was set to expire.  J.P.’s state that roads still need repair.  Act is passed 
extending the term for 21 years and transferring authority to a body of trustees.  Tolls 






















Original act names 33 trustees.  Creditors state that they borrowed 6400 pounds, but 
cannot be paid unless the term is extended and the tolls are increased.  Act is passed 
extending the term of the original act to 30 years.  It also requires that trustees borrow 
new funds and repay creditors; otherwise the creditors could take receivership of the 
tolls.  Trustees were unable to borrow and creditors took over temporarily, before 
commissioners appointed a new body of trustees.  Second Act is passed extending the 
term for 23 years.  Authority is vested in the trustees for the first act and those who 
took over after receivership. The rights vested in third act expired in 1739.  A new act 
was initiated by inhabitants of Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire stating that the road 

















Original act names Wiltshire JPs as trustees.  First renewal act initiated 2 years before 
original act was set to expire.  J.P.’s state that term needs to be extended to repay the 
5000 pounds in debts.  Act is passed extending term for another 21 years.  The tolls on 
cattle are reduced, all others remain unchanged.  Second renewal is initiated 3 year 
before previous act expired.  J.P.’s state that the term needs to be extended to pay off a 
debt of 700 pounds.  The act is passed extended the term for another 21 years.  The 

















Original act names JPs as trustees. First renewal is initiated one year before original 
act is set to expire.  JP’s petition that road cannot be further improved unless term is 
extended.  JP’s from eastern portion of Kent also petition that tolls should be used to 
pay for road from Chatham and Boughton under the Bleane.  Act is passed extending 
the term.  It also requires JP’s to pay a subsidy to surveyors on road from Chatham and 
Boughton under the Bleane.   
 
Shepards Shord 
to Horsley, 2 












Original act names JPs as trustees. The first amendment act is initiated six years before 
it was set to expire.  Trustees petition that debts cannot repaid and road cannot be 
repaired if the term is not extended.  After the second reading the committee reviewing 
the bill is instructed by someone in the House that “they have power to provide in the 
bill that the trusts, by the former act shall cease and determine, and that proper powers, 
for the effectual amending the highways, directed to be repaired by the former act, be 
vested in other trustees.” Act is passed naming a new body of trustees.   
Stokenchurch to 








Original act names trustees. First renewal act was initiated in the year the original act 
was set to expire.  Trustees petition that the term needs to be extended to keep the road 
in repair.  MP reported from the committee that the debts had been paid off.  Act is 
passed extending the term. The tolls on coaches are reduced. 





Table 13: Acts after 1689 altering rights for River Undertakers created between 1605 and 1688  
 
River, Act  Year Details 
 
Great Ouse, St. 
Neots to St. Ives, 6 











Original undertaker Jason Gason had sold rights to Arnold Spencer.  Spencer lost his 
rights to his creditors in 1650s.  Samuel Jemmatt purchased the rights from Spencer’s 
creditors.  Henry Ashley purchased Jemmatt’s rights in the 1680s, but it was disputed.  
Court case in 1687 split ownership between Jemmatt and Ashley.  Ashley is given 
further powers to improve the river by the act in 1719.  
 
Thames, near 









Original Commissioners in Oxford are named to oversee improvements by act in 1624.  
Act in 1694 allows Justices of the Peace the right to regulate water carriage rates on 
the Thames.  The act does not change the authority of commissioners near oxford, but 
it does allow for appeals to the Justices of Assize for Oxfordshire.  The 1729 act 
renews the provisions of the 1694 act. 
Colne, near 
Colchester, 9 







Act in 1698 establishes the mayor’s of Colchester’s authority to improve the Colne.  
The original undertaker is not known.    
 
 








Henry Lambe was originally given rights to improve the Lark.  The 1698 act gave 
Henry Ashley authority as undertaker.  There is no mention of Lambe’s patent in the 
act or in the petitions to Parliament. 
 
Tone, 10 William 






John Mallet originally had a patent for the Tone.  The patent was renewed by Mallets 
heirs in 1684. The 1698 act named new undertakers.  The act confirmed the 
conveyance of rights in the Tone from Mallet’s heirs to the new undertakers.  







Arnold Spencer was originally given a patent for the Stour. Act in 1705 names new 
undertakers. Assignees of patent John Little and Benjamin Dodd lose authority. 
 
Yorkshire, 13 
George I, c. 33 
1725 
 
Undertakers received rights by charter from Cromwell.  Their rights were voided by 
Restoration settlement.  Act in 1725 names city leaders as undertakers 
 
Wye and Lugg, 7 & 





Sandys family originally has rights by an act in 1662.  1695 act names new 
undertakers.   
 
 
Medway, 13 George 
II, c. 26 
1739 
 
Lord McCoskory and others are original undertakers.  Committee for 1739 act states 
they did not complete the navigation.  1739 act names new body of undertakers.   
































































































































































































Figure 1: Four-Year Moving Average of Completed Investment in 
Road and River Improvements, 1607-1749
 
Sources: see appendix 





































































































































































Figure 2: Four-year Moving Average of Proposed Investment in Road 
and River Improvements,  1607-1749
 
 
Sources: see appendix 
Notes: The four-year moving average is equal to the average of proposed investment in t-3, t-2, t-1, and t. 
 
 
  